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Abstract 
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I. Introduction 
In finance literature, it is known that there are 
argues that there is a relationship between corporate 
performance and ownership structure of the firms, 
however institutional and economic influences differ 
from both nationwide and internationally. The major 
objective of this study is to provide an empirical 
evidence to respond to the argument that, ownership 
structures differ according to companies’ financial 
performances. 
There are generally two basic types of 
ownership structure in Turkish economic environment, 
private and publicly ownership. When looking private 
sector, there is a tendency to foreign weighted ownership 
structure from domestic one in the last decade. In this 
study, we have taken into account the concentration of 
the shares in one hand or a group. In other words, the 
performance differences between sub samples such as 
private and public or domestic and foreign owner/s, and 
etc. weighted firms are not tested separately, because it is 
subject to another research in the literature. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: After 
the Introduction, Section 2 is about to explain theoretical 
foundation and reviews the ownership structures and 
their significance in the corporate governance. Section 3 
presents the research method, including hypotheses, 
research variables, model buildings, population and 
sample selection, data collection method, and statistical 
test. The findings of the study and hypotheses and 
discussion of the article is reported in section 4. Finally, 
5th Section has concluding remarks of the study. 
II. Literature Review 
According to Craswell at al. (1997), the impact 
of the ownership structure on corporate performance 
occurs in at least three ways. First, there are studies 
which test for ex post performance effects. Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) do not find evidence of a linear relationship 
between three measures of ownership concentration and 
measures of profitability.1Morck et al. (1988) also point 
to Demsetz and Lehn’s failure to distinguish between the 
holdings of board members and those of other large 
stockholders.  
Second, there are studies that relate ownership 
structure to actions or events which are believed to affect 
future corporate performance, typically evidenced by 
share price changes associated with the event in question. 
However, given the differing context in which these 
studies occur, it is difficult to generalize about the 
probable influence of ownership structure on corporate 
performance. 
Third, there are the studies which examine the 
ex-ante impact of ownership structure as captured in 
firms’ market value. In contrast to Demsetz and Lehn’s 
focus on the ex post performance measures, Morck et al. 
(1988) examine the relationship between insiders’ stock 
ownership and firm performance (as measured by 
Tobin’s Q) for 371 large US firms. To capture possible 
non-linearities, Morck et al. use a piecewise regression 
and find that for every 1 percent increase in ownership in 
the range of 0 to 5 percent, Q raises significantly, for a 
similar increase in ownership between 5 to 25 percent, Q 
declines significantly and beyond 25 percent, Q begins to 
rise again although at a slower rate. They argue that the 
positive relationship, at relatively low levels of insider 
                                                          
1 These measures of concentration are the 
percentage of common stock held by the largest twenty 
stockholders and a similar measure restricted to the five 
largest stockholders, and a Herfindahl measure of 
ownership concentration. Additional control variables 
include dummy indicators for utilities and financial 
firms, along with capital, advertising and research and 
development expenditure and firm size. Profitability is 
measured by accounting profit after tax expressed as a 
percentage of book equity value. 
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holdings, reflects a convergence of managerial and 
stockholder interests.  
In empirical studies on the relationship 
between the ownership and control structure and 
corporate performance, researchers encounter different 
econometric problems that, if not addressed, can result in 
erroneous inference on the relationship between the 
variables. Considering the multiple regression technique 
by researchers working on the subject, three sources of 
endogeneity must be highlighted that could derail the 
studies’ results: the omission of variables, the feedback 
effect, and the reverse causality (“simultaneous 
determination”) Börsch-Supan&Köke, (2002); Barros et 
al. (2010). As explained by Barros et al. (2010), the 
“assumption of exogeneity of regressors” in the 
regression model excludes the possibility of correlation 
between the explanatory variables and the random error 
term. If this assumption is invalid, the regressors are 
endogenous and should mitigate endogeneity; otherwise, 
the parameters will be biased. 
According to Börsch-Supan&Köke, (2002), the 
omission of variables that are relevant to the estimated 
model occurs for two reasons: the non-availability of 
data on potentially important variables for corporate 
governance studies, and lack of knowledge about the 
type of that explains the relationship between the 
variables. Silveira (2010) noted that omissions of 
variables can result in a spurious correlation between 
variables of interest, also known as the fallacy of the 
common cause. The use of control variables and the 
procedures of Random and Fixed Effects, as in the 
studies by Claessens et al. (2002) and Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz (2009), are a way to combat the problem. 
Claessen et al. (2002) analyzed the impact of 
the participation of the largest shareholder in the 
ownership and control on corporate market value. By 
employing regression with random effects on a sample of 
1.301 companies from eight different countries in East 
Asia, the authors found evidence that ownership 
concentration and control concentration influenced 
Tobin’s Q positively and negatively, respectively. Thus, 
the conclusions from the study suggested that the 
incentive and entrenchment effects can be captured 
through proxies linked to cash flow and voting rights in 
organizations. 
Lehman and Weigand (2000) found ownership 
concentration to affect profitability significantly 
negatively in panel regressions for 361 German 
corporations over the time period 1991 to 1996. 
Although they showed this effect depends intricately on 
stock market exposure, the location of control rights, and 
the time horizon. 
Mishra et al. (2001) examined a sample of 120 
Norwegian, founding family controlled and non-
founding family controlled firms.  They found a positive 
association between founding family control and firm 
value for alternative definitions of founding family 
control.  
Faccio and Land (2002) analyzed the ultimate 
ownership and control of 5,232 corporations in 13 
Western European countries. Typically firms are widely 
held (36.93%) or family controlled (44.29%). They 
found that financial and large firms are more likely 
widely held, while non-financial and small firms are 
more likely family controlled.  
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) investigated 
whether there is strong evidence to support the notion 
that variations across firms in observed ownership 
structures result in systematic variations in observed firm 
performance. The paper tested this hypothesis by 
assessing the impact of the structure of ownership on 
corporate performance, measured by profitability, using 
data for 175 Greek listed firms.  According to their study 
ownership structure is positively related to higher 
profitability of analyzed firms. 
Cornett et al. (2008) investigated the relation 
between institutional investors' involvement and 
operational performances of the large sized firms. 
Institutional ownership of shares, institutional investor 
representation on the board of directors, and the presence 
of independent outside directors on the board all reduce 
the use of discretionary accruals. They found that there 
was a significant relationship between operating cash 
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flow returns of the companies and the percentage of the 
institutional stock ownerships.  
Fahrenbrach and Stulz (2009) investigated the 
possible determinants of insider ownership and its impact 
on the market value of 4.900 companies in the United 
States for the period from 1988 to 2003. The authors 
applied probit models and linear regression, both with 
fixed effects. The results indicated that good stock 
performance generally decreases managerial ownership, 
and an increase in shares held by managers tends to 
increase Tobin’s Q. However a large reduction in 
managerial ownership did not result in a decline in firm 
market value. 
Gurbuz et al (2010) investigated the impact of 
corporate governance on financial performance in 
Turkey, taking the issue of institutional ownership into 
account. The paper employs panel data analysis on a 
sample of 164 firm-year observations for real sector 
firms on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) covering the 
4 year time span between 2005- 2008. The results of the 
analyses demonstrate the positive influence of corporate 
governance and institutional ownership on financial 
performance. Additionally, the impact of institutional 
investors is found to be more strongly pronounced on 
firms listed on the corporate governance index. 
Azofra and Santamaría (2011) investigated the 
relationship between ownership structure and the 
corporate performance of 80 Spanish banks between 
1996 and 2004. The results of the study’s regression 
models, estimated by the GMM (Generalized Method of 
Movements)2, indicated that the greater the separation 
between the largest shareholder’s cash flow and voting 
rights, the smaller the company’s return on assets, and 
there is no difference between ownership and control, the 
                                                          
2
GMM, has performedbyGugler et al. (2008) 
andAzofraandSantamaría (2011), is a sorurse of 
endogeneoty in corporatefinancestudies (Wintoki, Linck, 
&Netter, 2012) is a way of 
mitigatingfeedbackeffectorfeedbackloop of 
theresponsevariabletotheregressors. 
Thiseffectemergeswhenthepastvalues of 
thedependentvariablesinfluencethecontemporaryand/orfu
turevalues of theindependentvariables (Barros, Castro 
Júnior, Silveira, &Bergman, 2010). 
relationship between the controlling shareholder’s 
shareholding and the bank’s profitability is not 
monotonic. 
Drakos and Bekiris (2010) studied the impact 
of ownership structure on the market value of 146 
companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange from 
2000 to 2004. Regression estimated by Two Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) and Three Stage Least Square (3SLS) 
were used. The authors found that inside directors’ 
shareholdings (member of the executive board) and the 
accumulation of shares by investors who owned more 
than1% of the shares and who did not participate in 
senior management positively influenced Tobin’s Q. 
Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2011) 
applied piecewise OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) 
regressions and 2SLS regressions with random effects in 
a non-balanced panel composed of 76 Spanish 
companies for the period from 1999 to 2002. The results 
generally pointed to the existence of a quadratic 
relationship between large shareholders’ shareholding 
(who owned more than 5% of the shares) and Tobin’s Q. 
An increase in ownership concentration increased the 
corporate market value up to 60% accumulation of the 
shares, and the market value decreased after that point. 
Luo et al (2013) used data from Chinese family 
listed companies from 2004 to 2007. The study showed 
inverse U-shaped relationships between contest for 
control and corporate market value, as measured by 
Tobin’s Q, and between the number of large shareholders 
and corporate market value. Findings indicated that at 
low to medium levels of contest for control or number of 
large shareholders, formal institutions can strengthen. 
Jusoh (2014) investigated the effect of audit 
quality on company performance. Panel data of 730 
Malaysian public listed companies were examined. The 
results showed that managerial ownership had negative 
and significant relationship with ROA and Tobin’s Q. In 
contrast, institutional ownership showed positive and 
significant relationship with ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
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III. Methodology and Data 
The objective of this research is to identify 
financial effects of the various ownership structures on 
the performances of the BIST 30 companies, which are 
the biggest open to public companies according to firm 
size by their volume in Turkish stock market. Therefore, 
in this study we investigate the role of the different 
ownership concentration structures on the performances 
of the companies. 
Research Hypotheses: 
The Main Hypothesis is “there is a significant 
relationship between ownership structure and the 
performances of the BIST 30 companies”. 
So “There is a significant relationship between 
the size of the largest share of the firm equity and the 
firm performance”  
Research Variables: 
We examine the effects of ownership structure 
on firm value among listed Turkish non-financial BIST 
30 companies. Data used for this analysis come from two 
sources. First, the ownership structures were taken from 
annual reports of related firms. The other sources of data 
are based on the financial ratios of firms announced to 
public.  
The dependent variable of this study is "the 
value of the firm" which is represented by the 
performances of the companies. The performance was 
measured by Tobin’s Q = (Market Value / Book Value). 
In order to assess the relationship between 
corporate performance and ownership structure, as a 
measure of performance, Craswell at al. (1997) indicated 
that US researchers have utilized Tobin’s Q (=Market 
Value / Book Value).  
The multivariate regression method consists of 
different forms and their difference is related to selecting 
the predicting variables. For determining the regression 
equation in this article, the following formula was 
extracted: 
Y  = α + β1Χ1 + β2Χ2 +…+ βnΧn 
Y: company's performance  
α: Constant 
Χ1 , Χ2 ,…, Χn : independent variables   
β1 , β2 ,…, βn: coefficient of the achieved 
regressions for each variables. 
The statistical data could be managed via three 
ways: cross sectional, time series and panel data 
approach. With the panel data method researchers can do 
cross sectional observations within different time 
periods. In this study, the panel method (Brooks, 2008) 
was exerted. By employing panel data, a group of data 
which cover a great number of cross sectional variables 
(N) that is obtained during a time period (T) is collected. 
The number of observations (N×T) could be estimated by 
different models. Efficient estimations could be 
determined by exerting the panel data model.  
If the immeasurable variables are controlled by 
exerting Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS), then the variables have efficient 
estimations. One way for controlling is expending the 
fixed effects model. In the fixed effects model, the 
unobserved effects will enter into the fixed statement of 
the regression model.  
With different tests such as Hausman or the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, one could 
select suitable estimates. After selecting a suitable 
model, the continuity of the time series and the reliability 
of the regression should be followed. 
The population of this study includes non-
financial Turkish BIST 30 firms from 2008 to 2013 (6 
years) period. Turkish BIST 30 market is the one of the 
world’s best performing stock exchanges and has been 
categorized as an emerging market.  
Reliability of the continuity of the explanatory 
variables as well as control variables were studied. It is 
observed that studied variables’ mean and variances 
during the time period and the covariance of the 
variables were stable. As a result of exerting these 
variables in this model, we did not have a spurious 
regression.  
We use both time series and cross sectional 
elements. Panel data (or longitudinal data) keeps the 
same individuals (firms) entities.  
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Yit  = α + βΧit +uit 
Yit= Dependent variable. 
α = Intercept term. 
β = kx1 vector of parameters to be 
estimated on the explanatory variables. 
Χit = 1xk vector of observations on 
the explanatory variables. 
t = 1, …,T (term) 
i= 1, …, N (firm) 
The applicability of this technique is limited. It 
can be employed only when the number of time series 
observations, T, per cross sectional unit, i, is at least as 
large as the total number of such unit, N.  
The simplest types of fixed effects models 
allow the intercept in the regression model to differ 
cross-sectionally but not over time. 
Yit  = α + βΧit + μi + υit 
uit= μi + υit 
We can think of μi as encapsulating all of the 
variables that affect Yi tcross- sectionally but do not vary 
over time-for example, the sector that a firm operates in, 
a person’s gender, or the country where a bank had its 
headquarters, and etc. This model could be estimated 
using dummy variables, which would be termed the least 
squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach (Brooks, 
2008).  
The fixed effects approach is a sensible one, 
given the data analyzed here, since there is an unusually 
large number of years compared with the number of 
firms (19), resulting in a total of (114 =19 firm x 6 years) 
firm years observation. 
The data employed in the study are obtained 
from firms’ annual reports and BIST 30 Index statistics. 
The analysis is conducted for the whole sample 
period of 2006-2013.  
The model equation can be defined as: 
Perfit = α0 + α1OwnStrit + β1EBITSls + 
β2EBITCpt β4LiqR + β5DbtR + β6EqtTotAssts + 
β7EBITTotAssts + β7EBITEqt + γ1GROWTH + μi + υit 
Where Perfit: corporate performance = Tobin’s Q = 
Market Value / Book Value, 
α : intercept term, 
β : k x 1 vector of observations on the 
explanatory variables,  
t = 1, …, T; i= 1,…, N. 
In order to control the effects of extraneous 
variables on the performance of the companies, seven 
control variables were also selected as follows:  
1. EBITSls : EBIT/Sales Ratio (EBITTOSALES) 
2. EBITCpt : EBIT/Capital (EBITTOCAPITAL) 
3. LiqR: Liquidity Ratio, 
4. DbtR : Total Debts/Total Assets, 
5. EqtTotAssts : Equity/Total Assets, 
6. EBITTotAssts : EBIT/Total Assets. 
7. EBITToEq: EBIT/Equity: 
8. OWNER: the largest share of the firm equity 
μi  =firm specific fixed effect, 
υit= idiosyncratic disturbance term. 
As mentioned above, this research’s 
independent variable and ownership structure were 
considered as follows: The size of the largest share of the 
firm equity. The owner of the largest share may be 
publicly (or governmental) shareholdings, foreign 
investors, family shareholdings or domestic private 
shareholdings. 
In this research, the followings were studied by 
the regression equation: Auto-correlation, the amounts of 
determining coefficient, and the significance of the 
model and its coefficient. 
For determining whether a regression model 
error statements were self-correlated or not, the Durbin-
Watson test was employed. In Durbin-Watson test the 
model hypotheses are:  
Ho : ρ = 0 
H1 : ρ ≠ 0 
In this model, when ρ is positive, self 
correlation is positive and when ρ is negative, self 
correlation is negative and if ρ=0, there’s no self 
correlation. 
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Determining coefficient is a criteria which 
explain the strength of the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. The amount of this 
coefficient, in fact, determines what percentages of 
changes of the dependent variables are explained by the 
independent variables. 
The significance of the regression equation was 
determined by F-statistic and related hypothesis were as 
follows (Pindycky&Rubinfield, 2001): 
Ho :β1 = β2 = … = βk = 0 
H1 :Ǝβi ≠ 0 : i = 1,2, …, k 
If Ho is rejected (with 95 percent probability), 
the regression equation is significant. After 
implementing the regression significance test, the 
regressions of each of the coefficients should have been 
tested. The test hypotheses are presented below: 
Ho : β1  = 0 means the population coefficient is 
zero, 
H1 : β1 ≠ 0 means the population coefficient is 
not zero. 
For testing these hypotheses, t test was 
employed. In this test (with 95 percent probability) if we 
couldn’t reject Ho, it means that the considered 
coefficient isn’t significant and its rejection means the 
opposite. 
IV. Empirical Results 
The descriptive statistics of the variables and the results 
of the normality test are given in Table 1. The normality 
for five variables showed significant at 1 percent 
(P<0.01), two variables showed significant at 5 percent 
(P<0.05), and LiqR showed significant at 10 percent 
(P<0.01).  
Different models are developed from the 
variables except EqtTotAssts.  The F-statistic for one 
model is statistically significant at 5 % level.  Table 2 
reports that ownership coefficient on Tobin’s Q is 
negative and significant at 5 percent level (P<0.05). 1 
percent increase in the size of the largest share of the 
firm equity will decrease 0.044871 in Tobin’s Q.   
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics and Normality Test 
 
 
TOBI
NSQ 
OWN
ER 
EBIT
TSls 
EBIT
Eq 
LiqR 
EqtTo
tAssts 
EBIT
Cpt 
EBITTot
ASSTS 
DbtR 
Mean 
2.387
632 
53.56
193 
0.098
596 
0.213
333 
1.4887
72 
0.4130
70 
0.142
895 
0.07894
7 
0.859
825 
Media
n 
1.485
000 
52.37
000 
0.070
000 
0.190
000 
1.4000
00 
0.4000
00 
0.120
000 
0.07000
0 
0.580
000 
Maxim
um 
19.88
000 
97.92
000 
0.500
000 
0.670
000 
3.0800
00 
0.8000
00 
0.640
000 
0.25000
0 
34.45
000 
Minim
um 
0.390
000 
26.00
000 
-
0.090
000 
-
0.100
000 
0.5800
00 
0.0800
00 
-
0.090
000 
-
0.08000
0 
0.200
000 
Std. 
Dev. 
3.329
065 
14.33
453 
0.096
376 
0.153
679 
0.5695
72 
0.1607
84 
0.124
109 
0.06275
9 
3.177
465 
Skewn
ess 
3.709
338 
0.499
932 
1.666
322 
0.635
785 
0.4922
03 
-
0.0659
77 
1.606
568 
0.60200
8 
10.49
949 
Kurtos
is 
16.96
225 
4.136
021 
6.749
212 
3.308
428 
2.5018
85 
2.5120
10 
6.639
115 
3.26386
5 
111.5
000 
Jarque
-Bera 
1187.
411 
10.87
880 
119.5
248 
8.132
079 
5.7815
76 
1.2138
46 
111.9
452 
7.21657
7 
5801
2.69 
Proba
bility 
0.000
000* 
0.004
342* 
0.000
000* 
0.017
145** 
0.0555
32*** 
0.5450
25 
0.000
000* 
0.02709
8** 
0.000
000* 
Sum 
272.1
900 
6106.
060 
11.24
000 
24.32
000 
169.72
00 
47.090
00 
16.29
000 
9.00000
0 
98.02
000 
Sum 
Sq. 
Dev. 
1252.
342 
2321
9.11 
1.049
575 
2.668
733 
36.658
63 
2.9212
25 
1.740
545 
0.44507
4 
1140.
880 
Obser
vation
s 
114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
 
Notes: * significant at 1 percent (P<0.01) 
** Significant at 5 percent (P<0.05) 
*** Significant at 10 percent (P<0.10) 
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The study result shows that, when the large 
shares of the companies are held by one individual or a 
few persons or a group, the firm performances are 
affected negatively. The result appropriates the agency 
theory. The existence of large shareholders and 
concentrated ownership influence the level of agency 
cost and companies performance (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). 
Except from the variables OWNER, EBITSls 
and EBITCpt, the others tested EBIT/Capital, LiqR, 
DbtR, EqtTotAssts, EBITTotAssts, EBIT/Total Assets, 
EBITToEq are not found significantly in this study. So 
Table 2 below shows the results of the significance level 
of the explanatory variables OWNER, EBITSls and 
EBITCpt. 
Then we rewrite the model as: 
TOBINSQ = -0.04487145591*OWNER - 
5.787288895*EBITTOSALES + 
17.21702618*EBITTOCAPITAL + 2.901417306 + 
[CX=F, PER=F] 
 
Table 2.Results of Panel Least Squares 
Dependent Variable: TOBINSQ 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Date: 02/04/15   Time: 13:36 
Sample: 2008 2014 
Cross-sections included: 17 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 114 
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
t-Statistic Prob. 
OWNER -0.044871 0.019282 
-
2.327154 
0.0223** 
EBITTOSALES -5.787289 2.147322 
-
2.695120 
0.0084* 
EBITTOCAPITAL 17.21703 1.919293 8.970503 0.0000* 
C 2.901417 1.130206 2.567158 0.0119** 
 Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
R-squared 0.848528 
Mean dependent 
var 
2.387632 
Adjusted R-squared 0.805496 S.D. dependent var 3.329065 
S.E. of regression 1.468203 
Akaike info 
criterion 
3.803234 
Sum squared resid 189.6945 Schwarz criterion 4.427279 
Log likelihood -190.7843 F-statistic 19.71865 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.962473 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Notes: * significant at 1 percent (P<0.01),  ** significant 
at 5 percent (P<0.05) 
V. Conclusion 
This study demonstrated that large 
shareholders and concentrated ownership of the firms 
would actually lead to different financial performances. 
The statistical population in this study includes 19 non-
financial companies in the period of years between 2008 
and 2013 in BIST 30 stock exchange, which are the 
biggest open to public companies according to firm size 
by their volume in Turkish stock market. According to 
test results, there is a significant relationship between 
Turkish BIST 30 non-financial companies’ ownerships 
structure and their performances. 
 
REFERENCES 
Azofra, V., Santa Maria, M., (2011)Ownership, 
control, and pyramids in Spanish 
commercial banks. Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 35(6), 1464-1476. 
Börsch-Supan, a. &Köke, J. (2002) An applied 
econometricians’ view of empirical 
corporat governance studies. German 
Economic Review, 3 (3), 295-323. 
Brooks, Chris, 2008, Introductory 
Econometrics for Finance, Cambridge 
University Press, Second Edition 
Cornett, M.M., A.J. Marcus and H. Tehranian. 
2008. Corporate governance and pay-
for-performance: The impact of 
earnings management. J. Financial 
Econ.. 87: 357-373. 
 
Volume 5 No 2 (2015)   |   ISSN 2158-8708 (online)   |   DOI 10.5195/emaj.2015.75  |   http://emaj.pitt. 
 
The Relationship between Corporate Performance and  
Ownership Structure: Evidence from Turkey 
Page |16| Emerging Markets Journal 
Cornett, M.M., A.J. Marcus, A. Saunders and 
H. Tehranian, 2007.The impact of 
institutional ownership on corporate 
operating performance. J. Banking 
Finance, 31: 1771-1794. 
Claessens, S., Djankov S., Fan, J.P.H. & Lang, 
L.H.P. (2002). Diesntangling the 
incentive and entrenchment effects of 
large shareholdings. The Journal of 
Finance, 57 (6), 2741-2771) 
Craswell, Taylor and Saywell, 1997, 
Ownership Structer and Corporate 
Performance: Australian evidence, 
Pasific-Basin Finace Journal 5, 301-
321. 
Demsetz, H. & Lehn. K., (1985), The Structure 
of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences. Journal of Political 
Economy. 93, 1155-1177.  
Dracor, A. &Bekiris, F. V. (2010). Corporate 
Performance, Managerial Ownership 
and Endogeneity: A Smultaneous 
Equation Analysis for the Athens Stock 
Exchance. Research in International 
Business and Finance, 24 (1), 24-38. 
Faccio, M. &Lan, L.H.P., 2002. The ultimate 
ownership of Western European 
corporations.Journal of Financial 
Economics. 65: 365-395. 
Fahlenbrach, R., &Stulz, R.M. (2009), 
Managerial Ownership Dynamics and 
Firm Value. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 92 (3), 342-361. 
Garcia-Meca, E. & Sanchez-Ballesta, J.P. 
(2011).Firm Value and Ownership 
Structure in Spanşsh Capital Market. 
Corporate Governance, 11 (1), 41-53. 
Gugler, K., Mueller, D.C. and Yurtoğlu, B.B. 
(2008). Insider Ownership, Ownership 
Concentration and Investment 
Performance: An International 
Comparison. Journal of Corporate 
Finance. 14 (5), 688-705. 
Gürbüz, A. Osman,  Aslı Aybars. ÖzlemKutlu. 
2010. Corporate Governance and 
Financial Performance with a 
Perspective on Institutional Ownership: 
Empirical Evidence from Turkey. 
Journal of Applied Management 
Accounting Research. Vol. 8  No. 2 
Jensen, M. C. &Meckling, W. 1976. Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs, and ownership structure. Journal 
of Financial Economic. 3. 305-350. 
 
 
 
Volume 5 No 2 (2015)   |   ISSN 2158-8708 (online)   |   DOI 10.5195/emaj.2015.75  |   http://emaj.pitt.edu 
 
Hicabi Ersoy, Ayben Koy 
Emerging Markets Journal | P a g e  |17 
 
Jin-hui Luo,  Di-fang Wan,  Di Cai and Heng 
Liu. Multiple Large Shareholder 
Structure and Governance: The Role of 
Shareholder Numbers, Contest for 
Control, and Formal Institutions in 
Chinese Family Firms. Management 
and Organization Review 9:2. July 
2013.265–294. 
Jusoh, Mohd Abdullah. 2014. Equity 
Ownership, Audit Quality and Firm 
Performance in Malaysia using 
Generalized Least Square Estimations 
Technique. Journal of Emerging Issues 
in Economics. Finance and Banking 
(JEIEFB) An Online International 
Monthly Journal. 2014 Vol: 3 Issue 1 
Kapopoulos, P. and S. Lazaretou, 2007. 
Corporate ownership structure and firm 
performance: Evidence from Greek 
firms. Corporate Governance: An Int. 
Rev..Vol. 15.No. 2. pp. 144-158. 
Lehman, E. &Weigand, J. 2000. Does the 
Governed Corporation Perform Better? 
Governance Structures and Corporate 
Performance in Germany’.European 
Finance Review.4(2).157-195. 
 
 
 
Mishra, C.S., T. Randqy and J.I. Jenssen, 
2001.The effect of founding family 
influence on firm value and corporate 
governance. J. Int. Finan. Manage. 
Accounting, Vol. 12.No. 3. pp. 235-
259. 
Morck. R., Schleiffer, A. &Vishny, R.W., 
(1988) Management ownership and 
market valuation: An ampirical 
analysis. Journal of Financial 
Economics. 20, 293-315. 
Web Sources: 
http://www.arcelikas.com/sayfa/152/Yillik_Faa
liyet_Raporlari 
http://www.bim.com.tr/Categories/654/faaliyet
_raporlari.aspx 
http://www.doganholding.com.tr/yatirimci-
iliskileri/Default.aspx 
http://www.enka.com/tr-
tr/Enka.aspx?MainID=68&ContentID=
154 
http://www.erdemir.com.tr/yatirimcilar/detay.a
spx?SectionID=WSVn2mSQRHuysoS
ZHUeC6A%3D%3D&ContentId=H0e
OXoTBgWZ5MhKYRJc%2B0w%3D
%3D 
http://www.fordotosan.com.tr/faaliyetraporlari.
htm 
Volume 5 No 2 (2015)   |   ISSN 2158-8708 (online)   |   DOI 10.5195/emaj.2015.75  |   http://emaj.pitt. 
 
The Relationship between Corporate Performance and  
Ownership Structure: Evidence from Turkey 
Page |18| Emerging Markets Journal 
http://kardemir.com/Yonetim.aspx?Sec=Yat&
Ani=yes&Lng=tr-TR&W=3 
http://www.koc.com.tr/tr-tr/yatirimci-
iliskileri/finansal-raporlar-ve-
istatistikler/faaliyet-raporlari 
https://www.migroskurumsal.com/Icerik.aspx?
IcerikID=162 
http://www.petkim.com.tr/Sayfa/1/176/YATIR
IMCI-ILISKILERI-OPERASYONEL-
VE-FINANSAL-VERILER-
FAALIYET-RAPORLARI.aspx 
https://www.sabanci.com/tr/yatirimci-
iliskileri/faaliyet-raporlari/k-29 
http://www.sisecam.com.tr/tr/yatirimci-
iliskileri/yillik-faaliyet-raporlari/ 
http://www.tekfen.com.tr/faaliyetraporu.asp 
http://www.tofas.com.tr/tr/yatirimci/Pages/Faal
iyetRaporlari.aspx 
http://www.tupras.com.tr/detailpage.tr.php?lPa
geID=12 
http://investor.turkishairlines.com/tr/mali-
veriler/faaliyet-raporlari/1/tum-
yillar/tum-donemler 
http://www.ttinvestorrelations.com/tr/mali-
operasyonel-veriler/faaliyet-
raporlari.aspx 
http://www.ulkerbiskuvi.com.tr/tr-
TR/yatirimci-iliskileri/yillik-faaliyet-
raporlari 
 
 
